In a speech on 13 July, Secretary General of Hizbullah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hizbullah is willing to target all offshore energy production in Israel if Lebanon is not permitted to develop its own offshore hydrocarbon resources, and that Lebanese negotiators should tell the world that Hizbullah is willing to start a regional war in order to extract concessions that favour Lebanon.
Hizbullah is willing to risk a war to obtain a favourable maritime boundary demarcation deal and investments in offshore Lebanese hydrocarbons.
Hizbullah does not want a civil war in Lebanon or a war with Israel. It also does not want Lebanon to continue dying a slow, agonising economic death that will only lead to instability, unrest and possibly civil war. Nasrallah said that he would rather that Lebanese people die as martyrs in a war with the enemy than die fighting over bread and fuel, as is currently happening. I accept that this is his calculation. When choosing between bad and worse options, weaklings cower and leaders gamble. Nasrallah is a leader, and he will gamble. He will calculate that he can maul Israel during a war, solidify Hizbullah’s role in the Iran axis, obtain military aid from Russia, force Israel to sign a maritime border demarcation agreement with Lebanon and force the West into giving Lebanon economic aid – the alternative being Lebanon sending to Europe millions of Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi refugees. Furthermore, a war would permit Hizbullah to target any domestic opponents as traitors and will likely push a sizeable portion of pro-US individuals to leave the country permanently, increasing Hizbullah’s power. For Nasrallah, the most Israel can do to him is kill him, allowing him to join his son, Hadi, whom Hizbullah regards as a martyr and who died fighting Israel. It is therefore my view that Hizbullah is willing to risk a war, and, as Nasrallah said, Hizbullah would prefer it to a slow death.
Hizbullah will likely attack Israeli offshore energy infrastructure before September 2022, with the aim of forcing concessions but while accepting the risk of regional war.
In his speech, Nasrallah highlighted the following. First, he pointed out that Lebanon’s economic recovery can only come from developing its hydrocarbons industry and using that to repay debt and boost standards of living. All other alternatives, Nasrallah correctly pointed out, will lead to slow collapse, civil unrest and eventually civil conflict. Second, he highlighted that this is a do-or-die moment. Israel wants to start production from Karish (a gas field along the disputed Lebanese-Israeli maritime border) in September. If it succeeds in doing so, it will be irrelevant where the maritime border is or whether it is demarked. As such, Nasrallah committed himself to resolving the demarcation issue before Israel starts production in Karish. Third, Nasrallah correctly pointed out, it makes no difference if there is a border demarcation agreement – Lebanon will theoretically have the right to extract hydrocarbons, but it will not be able to do so without foreign, specifically French, support. He therefore demanded that not only there be demarcation, but that the French company Total follows through with promised investments in Lebanon. Nasrallah said that he believes this to be the correct time to apply pressure to obtain these concessions, given the ongoing global energy crisis. Nasrallah noted that the 2 July operation, in which Israel shot down three UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) that Hizbullah had sent to Karish, was carefully calculated. Hizbullah wanted the Israelis to send jets and open fire at the UAVs to highlight to the operating companies that this is not a safe area for their work.
I anticipate that Hizbullah will conduct further attacks against Israeli hydrocarbon assets in Karish and possibly beyond Karish between now and September, with a view to preventing Israeli production. Future attacks will likely use more UAVs and emphasise the lack of safety for energy personnel. The intention will not be to kill personnel, but to damage assets, raising insurance premiums and forcing Israel and the West into making concessions. Hizbullah accepts that to achieve its objectives, it not only is willing to risk a war with Israel, but a regional war. That said, the next steps would depend on Israel’s response. If, after sending UAVs to threaten Karish, Israel and Lebanon sign a demarcation agreement and the French commit to invest in Lebanon, the risk of a war would decrease significantly.
Iraqi, Yemeni and Syrian involvement in an Israel – Hizbullah war is almost certain, with a severe risk that Iran would get involved, risking energy infrastructure in the Gulf. As such, Israel will be under intense pressure to keep any future war contained.
If Nasrallah’s coming gamble does lead to a war with Israel, it is almost certain that Ansar Allah in Yemen, Kataib Hizbullah in Iraq and the IRGC in Syria would fire rockets, UAVs and cruise missiles at Israel. Their objective would be to strain Israeli air defence systems and the Israeli air force, to prevent Israel from fully focusing on Hizbullah. For its part, Hizbullah will use mixed salvoes of high precision and unguided missiles to overwhelm Iron Dome, with a view towards targeting strategic Israeli military and civilian infrastructure, including the Haifa chemicals complex, offshore energy facilities, energy storage infrastructure, military airports, command and control centres and other locations in Israel. Should Israel respond by targeting Iran – which Israel describes as the head of the octopus – Iran would also use its considerable arsenal of missiles against Israel.
If Israel only attacks Iranian military assets and nuclear infrastructure, full scale attacks against GCC energy would be less likely. However, if Israel attacks Iran’s energy hub on Kharg Island, Iran would almost certainly attack Ras Tanoura port and Abqaiq energy complex in Saudi Arabia, Habshan energy complex in Abu Dhabi, and the North Dome Gas Field in Qatar. Attacks on international energy shipping would also be likely. Full scale Iranian participation in the war would also risk Iran launching Iraqi Shia militias against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In any such conflict, Russia and Iran would be operating as close allies. China would have no interest in oil prices rising, but would also view the engagement of both Iran and Russia in conflicts against the West as a prelude to an attack against China itself. Furthermore, any disruption to Gulf energy exports would make China far more dependent on Russia. It is likely that Western policymakers understand this complex picture, but the question is, can they keep Israel from escalating to avoid these risks materialising. For Israel, a war in which Hizbullah extracts a draw or a victory, as occurred in 2006, would discredit the Israeli military and political establishment and the viability of the Jewish state. Israel knows that after each conflict with its Iran-backed rivals, these rivals have eventually become even more capable and a greater threat to Israel. The question is, will Israel see this and sign a demarcation agreement, and will the West follow through with investments in Lebanon.