Iran nuclear talks: an excellent status quo
Endless negotiations without resolution is the best possible outcome. But as endless negotiations become less tenable, the US’ response may well encourage Iran to go for a nuclear weapon.
Key points:
The negotiations to revive the JCPOA are very unlikely to succeed. Iran doesn’t see enough economic benefits from reviving the JCPOA, while the Biden administration is too weak to push a renewed JCPOA through in the face of domestic opposition.
Under these circumstances, negotiations for their own sake become the best possible outcome. However, should continuing negotiations become untenable, the US’ options are much worse.
These options include escalating against Iran in the region by backing Iran’s rivals, risking renewed attacks on Saudi energy, as well as imposing more severe sanctions.
Iran would retaliate to either option by accelerating the nuclear programme further, getting close to the point where the next logical step would be to build a nuclear device.
This would intensify pressure on the US to use the military option, which in turn would make Iran racing towards a weapon more likely.
As such, continuing negotiations for their own sake, and doing nothing substantial if they break down, remains the US’ best option.
Negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are still ongoing with no concrete result, almost a year and a half since Joe Biden took office in 2021. It was assumed that the agreement would be revived almost instantly after the Biden Administration took office, to help solidify the position of Iran’s centrist then-President Hassan Rouhani. This obviously did not materialise, and hardliner Ibrahim Raisi, took office. It was then assumed that the US would rush into an agreement in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions on Russian energy. It has been six months since the invasion, with no agreement. An agreement is unlikely, as both sides benefit more from continuing negotiations than from reaching an agreement.
Nuclear bargaining chip
The first reason is the least spoken about: Iran’s nuclear programme is intended to extract concessions in the region, to raise Iran’s prestige and to give Iran a nuclear deterrent option at some unspecified date in the future. Its key current value to Iran is in keeping its threat hanging over the heads of Western powers that are terrified – without adequate justification – that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against Israel, rather than as a deterrent. Iran would not want to damage Lebanon’s Shia, Israel’s Palestinian population or the holy city of Jerusalem with a nuclear strike on Israel, nor would it want to risk retaliatory nuclear strikes from the US or Israel. Iran may well decide that it needs a nuclear deterrent, as I argue in this piece, but there is not enough reason to believe that it would engage in a first strike against anyone, even Israel, or that it is seeking a nuclear weapon now. It is worth recalling that Western and Israeli intelligence agencies have repeatedly said over the course of the past 20 years that Iran was within months of obtaining a nuclear weapon. This never materialised, even though Iran could have always bought nuclear secrets from North Korea or Pakistan. It chose not to do so. Rather, it opted for indigenous knowledge building, as well as a lengthy negotiation process that allowed it to force Europe and the US to sit at the negotiations table with Iran as their equal, to offer Iran concessions, and in doing so to raise Iran’s profile and prestige. We should understand the 2015 JCPOA in this light. Iran got enough concessions in the region – no real US effort to overthrow Assad in Syria, and the US backing Iran’s allies against Islamic State in Iraq. It got enough scientific concessions – Iran was permitted to continue its nuclear research activities, and just had to freeze its enrichment activities at a lower level. And Iran got enough economic concessions, at least so it believed at the time, including cash, the removal of key individuals and entities from sanctions lists, the unfreezing of its assets and a US effort to help Iran get some investments. The nuclear programme had fulfilled its negotiating function, and so, Iran saw fit to offer some temporary nuclear concessions that did not impede its nuclear programme for more than a decade. Indeed, upon the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran could rapidly deploy new centrifuges and enrich uranium to 60%, showing how limited and temporary Iran’s JCPOA concessions really were. Currently, however, there is no chance that the US can offer a similar batch of concessions, as I explain below. As such, Iran probably assesses that it is better to keep the nuclear issue alive, and with it the negotiations, Iranian prestige and the option of a nuclear deterrent, rather than to make concessions and finalise a new agreement.
Lack of benefits for Iran
To get the JCPOA past a very sceptical Congress, the Obama Administration engaged in some double speak. It promised Iran in the text of the JCPOA to cease the implementation of sanctions, giving Iran the impression that it could expect massive economic benefits. The Obama administration also told Congress it would implement sanctions, sometimes against the same entities, that related to what the US and regional allies define as terrorism, and what Iran views as resistance or regional issues. While it appears that the US did try to get foreign banks and companies to invest in Iran and to give Iran some economic benefits, the banks and companies in question balked. They could see the risk of a future administration not taking too kindly to the Obama Administration’s shenanigans, and mostly refrained from implementing planned investments or assisting Iran in a way that would leave them vulnerable to a future reimposition of sanctions. The hesitancy by Western companies to invest in Iran is likely to have intensified significantly since the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement. Investments in energy operate on a generational time horizon, typically 15 to 20 years. Investors are unlikely to view the US – Iran relationship as adequately stable beyond the 2024 presidential election, let alone over a 20 year timeframe. If a renewed JCPOA breaks down once again, Iran will want the ability to accelerate its nuclear programme from close to where the programme stands now, with a stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, not from where the programme stood at the time of the implementation of the JCPOA. Therefore, for Iran, long term concessions make no sense – the most Iran wants is some relaxation of the implementation of some sanctions, which it can obtain by continuing to negotiate over the JCPOA without either fully implementing its own part of the agreement or fully withdrawing from it. Already, Iran is selling oil and oil products via Oman, Malaysia, Iraq and the UAE, using a combination of ship-to-ship transfers, shadow companies, falsified paperwork and other techniques. All Iran wants from the US is to look the other way, under the threat of accelerating the nuclear programme further or attacking US interests in the region if the US does not.
Lack of benefits for the US
President Joe Biden’s administration has already humiliated itself in Afghanistan. It is failing in Ukraine, especially in terms of building a coalition against Russia. It was openly and repeatedly insulted by Saudi Arabia. It does not need a domestic fight against AIPAC, the Republicans and the large number of Democratic politicians who support Israel, just to get into a nuclear agreement with Iran that offers next to no benefits to America.
Moreover, if it tried to revive the JCPOA, the Biden administration may well find itself facing a defeat in Congress as Congress pushes a new resolution tightening sanctions on Iran, as had occurred during the Obama administration. This would at once discredit the administration domestically and internationally, and collapse any goodwill reached through a renewed agreement. Therefore, the best possible outcome for the current administration is to pursue negotiations for appearances’ sake and to manage the potential for escalation. For the Biden administration, the status quo is the best possible outcome.
Alternative Scenarios
The best possible outcome for all parties involved is to keep up appearances and talk for the sake of talking. That said, it may become impossible to pursue this policy. In which case, the Biden administration has a few bad options:
Escalate against Iran in the region: This would involve supporting Israel against Hizbullah, Saudi Arabia against the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement in Yemen, and the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkish-backed jihadi groups against the Assad government in Syria. This is within the “rules of the game” between the US and Iran but carries several risks. Israel could again face a humiliation at the hands of Hizbullah. Saudi energy infrastructure may suffer more damaging attacks at a time of disastrously high energy prices. And the rise of jihadis in Syria raises the risk of blowback against the West. Moreover, this carries a risk: Iran may view successful escalation – as in, military advances in the position of its regional rivals – as a prelude to an attack on Iran itself. This would encourage Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.
Impose more sanctions: This is a near certainty, but when have sanctions ever worked? Other than making the Biden administration look incompetent and impotent, it is hard to see what would be achieved. In addition, this would encourage Iran to escalate its nuclear programme even more rapidly. Iran is already enriching uranium to 60%, however. The next step is 90%. At which point, there will be massive pressure on the US to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon using military means. This would encourage Iran to go ahead and obtain a nuclear weapon, especially if it becomes evident that a hawkish, Republican administration is set to take power.
Attack Iran: For all the US’ military prowess, Iran would likely be able to conduct significant strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure in response to an attack on Iran itself. One risk is that the loss of communications in Iran that would be part of any initial strike on Iran would lead Iranian regional military commanders to throw everything into the fight immediately, while they still can. As such, even if the US planned a limited strike, Iran would respond disproportionately, with as much aggression as it could muster. This would make Arab states’ Persian Gulf energy infrastructure an immediate military target. Damage to their energy infrastructure would cause oil prices to rise to a level that collapses the global economy. Furthermore, if, as is likely, an attack fails to fully defeat Iran, the Islamic Republic would be more committed to building a nuclear weapon than ever.
Talk lots and do little: The US can say it is announcing more, ineffective sanctions. It can declare its intent to support anti-Iran proxies and allies, while keeping this support minimal. And it can call for more talks and negotiations, knowing full well that they probably won’t go anywhere. While unsatisfying, such an outcome is better than pushing Iran into escalation or than entering another war in the Middle East that could wreck Persian Gulf energy infrastructure as well as the global economy.