Iraq: Did Sadr just launch a civil war?
Muqtada al-Sadr has deployed paramilitary forces and seized government buildings in Baghdad and in several provinces, effectively threatening a civil war that could draw in regional players.
Key Points
The past few hours appear to be a prelude to civil war in Iraq. In response to what Sadr believes to be an Iranian attempt to split his followers, paramilitary forces loyal to Sadr deployed to the Green Zone in Baghdad and seized government buildings across Iraq.
Given that this is Sadr, it is possible, but unlikely, that he would withdraw his supporters and opt for a compromise. The door to compromise with Iran’s allies has been open to Sadr since the October 2021 elections, however, and Sadr has consistently refused to budge.
If these are indeed the opening shots in a civil war, such a conflict can be ended quickly either through Iran’s allies using overwhelming force against Sadr’s followers, or through killing Sadr.
If this does not happen, and Iraq enters a prolonged conflict, this would likely have significant commercial implications for energy and transportation companies. It will also likely generate a humanitarian crisis and increase migration from Iraq to Europe.
A prolonged conflict would draw in regional powers, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran, as well as the United States.
Iran’s allies would likely respond to intervention by regional powers through attacks using proxies against international oil shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, and attacks on energy and other infrastructure in Gulf Arab states.
Busy readers may skip the Key Events and Context parts to concentrate on the Forecast and Commercial Implications.
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Key Events:
Over the past few hours, followers of Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr deployed military units to the Green Zone, including Parliament. They briefly occupied and then left the presidential palace in the Green Zone. There was a report, which I cannot yet confirm, of an attack on an Asaib Ahl al-Haq location in Baghdad. There was also a report of an attack against Sadr’s militia in Basra by unidentified assailants, almost certainly from Iran-aligned popular mobilisation units. Sadr’s supporters also seized the governorate buildings in Maysan, Karbala, Diyala, Diwaniya, Samawa and Wasit. Previously, after the Federal Court had rejected Sadr’s demand to order fresh elections, Sadrists had attacked the court and closed it down. Meanwhile, there are widespread reports of stores closing out of fear of fighting between Sadrists and their rivals, including in Basra, Baghdad and other governorates. There are social media reports of food shortages, with citizens queuing to buy bread and other food items. And there are reports of fuel shortages, with long lines at gasoline stations. There are also reports of road closures, including the Erbil to Kirkuk road, the Kirkuk to Baghdad road at Khalis in Diyala Province and the Khanqin Road to the KRG. It is not clear if this is intended to stop the Barzani clan from sending its own militias from the KRG to support Sadr’s. There were reports of Sadr arriving in Tehran on 29 August, though this was denied by a Sadr supporter.
Context:
These incidents followed the announcement of the marja’ Sayyid Kathim al-Ha’eri that he would suspend his activities as a marja’ (source of emulation – a Shia religious scholar whose decrees are followed by a big portion of the Shia public). Ha’eri asked his followers to emulate Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sayyid Ali Khamenei. This was very likely done with Iran’s knowledge and blessing. In his letter announcing his stepping down, Ha’eri was heavily critical of Sadr without naming him, accusing him of not following the legacy of his father, Sayyid Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, and his father in law, Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Both are considered martyrs by most Shia Muslims as they were killed by the Saddam Hussein regime. Crucially, Ha’eri was one of the most senior students of the late Sayyid Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, who inspired almost all Shia Islamist political movements active today, is Sadr’s father in law, and was the cousin of Muqtada’s father. Many Iraqi Sadrists followed Ha’eri as their marja’, and so his transference of his authority to Khamenei had the potential to divide the Sadrist movement. Sadr reacted very aggressively, accusing Ha’eri of acting on someone else’s orders (implicitly Iran’s), sending his followers to the street and announcing, once again, his withdrawal from politics, though this time allegedly permanently. It is unclear if this is an impulsive decision by Sadr, or if it is calculated. Sadr’s rivals in Iraq have been willing to offer him his “fair” share of representation, patronage and corruption in any future cabinet since the October 2021 elections. It is Sadr who has consistently refused to join a national unity cabinet, insisting instead on escalation. Indeed, the Coordination Framework, an umbrella body that includes all Shia political parties that support Iran, issued a call for calm and asked for security forces to step in. The Coordination Framework called on Sadr to return to the political process and to dialogue. It is almost certain that the CF is not keen to engage in a Shia – Shia civil war. This goes against everything Iran has been working towards. (In Lebanon, Hizbullah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had said that Khamenei had asked for there to be no internecine Shia fighting in Lebanon, ending a brief Shia-Shia conflict that lasted from 1988 to 1990). Khamenei does not want to end his tenure as Supreme Leader, and his life, in a war that threatens everything the Islamic Revolution has achieved so far. This is an extremely difficult position for Iran and for the Supreme Leader. The status of the Sadr family is too high for it to be dealt with severely, and the extremely delicate politics of religious authorities and succession have gotten mixed up with Iran’s core national security interest in maintaining strong Shia rule over Iraq.
Forecast:
With Sadr having escalated so dramatically, it is difficult to see how he climbs back down, though if anyone could do that, it is him. Muqtada can withdraw his loyalists at will, and continue to wrestle with his Shia rivals, having made his point. That said, I do not believe Sadr wants to back down – at any point since the October 2021 elections, Sadr could have had his pick of key government positions, conditional that he shares power with other Shia parties that are backed by Iran. He consistently refused and chose to escalate militarily instead. As such, this appears the beginning of a civil war among Iraq’s Shia, which will almost certainly have the following effects:
It raises the risk of Sadr getting assassinated, as this escalation is entirely unacceptable to Iran, as I had argued here. The assassination of Sadr would lead to extended protests, riots and localised gunfights, but may well nip the civil war in the bud.
With Sadr attempting what appears to be a coup, Iran’s allies will eventually respond militarily, if not by killing Sadr, then by attacking the Green Zone and other government buildings and clearing his supporters from there by force. This can result in several weeks of fighting.
If Sadr is not assassinated, and this conflict continues for months rather than weeks, it will initially be focused on Baghdad’s Green Zone and on government buildings in southern Iraq. It will also spread to focus on seizing commercially relevant, strategic assets.
If it continues for several months, it will likely draw in Iran, the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia would work with the US to back the Sunnis and the Barzani clan against Iran’s allies, using financial and intelligence resources. The UAE will play a complex role where it alternates sides and tries to keep its relations with the US while avoiding Iranian retaliation. Iran cannot afford to lose Iraq, and is more likely to intervene directly.
A prolonged conflict will also likely result in Islamic State or some other form of Sunni militancy resurging in Iraq’s Anbar Province, with a view towards cutting off southern Iraq from the Syrian coast and from Lebanon, where the Alawis and Lebanon’s Hizbullah have their power base.
Commercial implications:
If this conflict is not resolved within a few days or a few weeks, the commercial implications will likely include the following:
Oil companies will likely receive extortion demands from militias in the south, ranging from Sadrists to clan based groups.
Transportation of goods across Iraq will become far riskier, due to checkpoints by rival groups demanding payments, increased thefts by militia groups, and fuel shortages.
Along the border with Jordan, Iraqi Sunni groups will likely deploy with a view towards extracting revenues from trucking traffic between Iraq and Jordan. A similar dynamic is likely along the border with Saudi Arabia.
There will be a major contest for the control of Iraq’s Umm Qasr port, as the only port of entry to Iraq, the control of which would generate enormous revenues as well as access to foreign support.
The intervention of regional powers against Iran’s allies will result in retaliation by these groups. Retaliation will include attacks from Iraq and Yemen against energy, aviation, shipping, electricity and other infrastructure in Persian Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Iran’s retaliation will also likely involve attacks by the IRGC against international energy shipping in the Persian Gulf and in the Sea of Oman. The Ansar Allah (Houthi) in Yemen may well also get involved, resuming attacks on shipping and especially against Saudi Arabia.
Food and fuel shortages will escalate, raising the need for humanitarian interventions to support civilians.
Migration from Iraq into Turkey and from there into Europe will increase, raising further pressure on the European Union.