Rafic Hariri, Muqtada al-Sadr and the future of Iraq.
What the logic of murdering Hariri tells us about the likelihood of assassinating Muqtada al-Sadr.
The investigations into the 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri blamed Hizbullah operatives for the crime, though the Special Tribunal for Lebanon did not accuse Hizbullah as an institution of the murder. The investigations relied on telecoms data to blame Hizbullah, though the latter blames Israel. Accepting for a moment the claim that Hizbullah was responsible for the murder, it is worth exploring, albeit speculatively, the reasoning behind such an act, to see how it could apply in Iraq in Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr’s situation.
Hariri said in conversations with the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, Walid al-Muallem, that he was responsible for France turning against Syria. At the time, this had led to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, issued in 2004. That resolution called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. This came at a time when the US had just used UN Security Council Resolution 1441 to justify the invasion of Iraq, using a highly debatable interpretation. Hizbullah, the Syrian government and the Iranian government would have been justified in assuming that such a resolution could pave the way for an attack against Syria and against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Indeed, this was considered by the US and was advocated for within US decision making centres. President George W Bush called Syria an “unusual and extraordinary threat”. The US was aiming to create a new and democratic Middle East.
Iran’s perspective
From the perspective of Iran, Syria and Hizbullah, former Prime Minister Hariri was cooperating with a US-led plan to overthrow the Syrian government through foreign invasion, something that the Syrian government would be prepared to fight using insurgency and civil war. Hizbullah and Iran would have naturally backed it in such an endeavour, as they eventually did from 2013 onwards. The threat, from their perspective, was that their power would be destroyed, their countries would be reduced as Iraq was, and their population would be plunged into a war against foreign occupation, where the occupiers would be backed by local politicians led by Hariri and his allies. Indeed, with his charisma, wealth and extensive foreign relations, Hariri would have been a natural candidate to lead Lebanese and Syrian Sunnis. In the eyes of the pro-Iran camp, Hariri would have been the region’s Hamid Karzai or Iyad Allawi.
From this perspective, killing Hariri was aimed at preventing the US and its allies from having a local ally that could help them stabilise Lebanon and Syria following a regime change war similar to the ones the US launched against Iraq and Afghanistan. It was aimed at preventing first foreign invasion and then civil war. It was aimed at destabilising the entire pro-Western camp in Lebanon and Syria by simply decapitating it. There is religious reasoning for such an assassination. The Quran posits that “causing civil strife is worse than murder”. Islamic jurisprudence, including Shia jurisprudence, permits the ruler to kill to prevent strife or instability. Indeed, this is the basis of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s interpretation of hiraba. Hiraba literally translates as making war, but can be expanded to include forms of dissent that are destabilising to society. Indeed, in one trial in Iraq, a police officer accused of murdering a protest organiser claimed that he had done so on a fatwa from Sayyid Ali Khamenei. Presumably, Khamenei’s reasoning would have been that such protests were part of a US plot to destabilise Iraq and ignite civil strife, and that targeting protest leaders was preferable to opening fire against massed protesters.
Muqtada’s fate
The above discussion on Hariri gives us some indicators of what would be entirely unacceptable to Iran and would therefore warrant killing Muqtada using a similar reasoning. This is a long introduction to explain the circumstances under which I think it’s possible for Iran to decide to kill Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, the maverick Iraqi politician who has been a headache for Iran, the United States and Iraq for 20 years.
Muqtada is locked in a struggle with his erstwhile rival, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who leads most Shia factions other than the Sadrists and is one of Iran’s more dependable allies. Recordings of Maliki were leaked in which he claimed that Muqtada was planning a civil war in Iraq, alongside his Sunni and Kurdish allies, and promising to deal with Sadr as he is the only person who knows how: Maliki had led government forces in a battle against Sadr in 2008. I cannot ascertain if this reflects the thinking of the wider Iran-led camp, but that may well be the case. And so, it is worth thinking about how Iran would make such a decision with respect to Sayyid Muqtada.
Muqtada is blocking government formation in Iraq by refusing to join other Shia parties in a coalition, national unity government. Such governments have been the norm for years, but Muqtada now claims that they bring about corruption and indecision. He is correct, of course, but he is conveniently ignoring key details about the role of his own supporters in corruption. More likely is that Sadr wants to increase his share in government beyond what his popularity warrants. He is very likely to push his supporters into the streets if the Iran-aligned Shia political class forms a cabinet without him. Should his rivals choose former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to lead the next government, then we can expect Sadr’s supporters to riot, and the security forces to use lethal force against them. This would threaten an internecine war between the Shia of Iraq. And that would be Iran’s red line.
If the Iranians perceive Sadr’s bid for power threatening civil strife in Iraq, for example, by attempting to disarm the Popular Mobilisation Forces, cutting off Iranian energy supplies to Iraq, or instigating unrest that would create an opening for Islamic State, they may conclude that killing Sadr has become justified. If Iran believed that it had two choices, one leading to complete chaos in Iraq, the loss of the Shia’s ability to govern and potentially civil war, and the other being to kill Sadr, then it would authorise such an operation. Iran would likely wish to avoid doing so – Sadr has a militia, a significant popular base, and inherited religious and family credibility. Sadr also has the implicit backing of at least some of the Najaf religious establishment, who have access to great wealth and manpower. To kill him would threaten great chaos. Iran would only take such a step if it thought it was the lesser of two evils. Until then, Sadr will keep playing his games, preventing the formation of a new cabinet, playing for time to weaken his rivals and push for new elections, and working hard to keep and expand the positions of power that have allowed his allies fabulous wealth.