Russia – Ukraine: The Tide Turns
After a string of defeats, Russia has now been forced to mobilise and to threaten nuclear attacks following a series of Ukrainian advances in Kharkov, Donetsk and Kherson.
Russia has announced that it will mobilise 300,000 troops from its reserves, focusing exclusively on men with a military background. As these troops will receive additional training before being sent to the frontline, this will take several months to complete. Furthermore, Russia’s clients and allies in Ukraine are planning referendums in four regions – Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson – to be held between 23 and 27 September, to decide on joining the Russian Federation. The result appears to be a forgone conclusion. Once these territories become part of Russia according to Russian law, Russian conscripts can legally be deployed there. In addition, during the mobilisation announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia would use all available weapons systems in the event of a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. Notably, I believe that this would apply to the newly annexed regions once the referendums are completed. As such, Russia appears to be both preparing itself for a long, bitter conflict, and attempting to deter Ukraine’s backers from pushing further against Russia using the threat of nuclear weapons.
Russian failures:
I had overestimated Russia’s military capability and underestimated that of Ukraine and of the impact of Western weapons provided to Ukraine. Russia is unable to dominate the air as the US does, as evidenced by the absence of in-depth regular airstrikes against military and dual use targets. Nor is Russia able to maintain total battlefield awareness through a combination of UAVs, satellites, and human intelligence, as evidenced by Ukraine’s ability to mass troops for counter offensives. Furthermore, while Russia has some advanced technologies in the Zirkon missiles, various air defence systems, the T-14 Armata tank and the Su-57 jet, it is unable to produce Su-57s at a large enough scale to seize total air control, nor is it able to produce Armata tanks in large enough numbers to dominate the battlefield. Russia’s dominance in artillery is significant, but has shown to be insufficient, especially as the country has not committed large enough infantry forces – yet. With the announcement of partial mobilisation, this may now change, but it will take a few months at least. Ukrainian soldiers outnumber Russia’s, and have the benefit of continuous, accurate intelligence obtained from the United States’ satellites and monitoring of Russian communications. Meanwhile, Russia is now essentially fighting all of NATO – almost all NATO countries have made financial or military contributions to Ukraine, with the US financing even Ukrainian salaries.
Russia is facing defeats in Kherson, Kharkov and Donetsk. In Kherson, the Russians are mostly holding the line for now, but are expecting major further offensives. In Kharkov, the risk to Ukraine’s position in the city has been reduced dramatically, even eliminated, for now. In Donetsk, hard won Russian-speaking areas have been lost. It appears that the Russians were overconfident in their abilities, and short in manpower. As such, they did not prepare fortified defensive positions, in part because they did not imagine that the Ukraine could counterattack, in part because they did not have enough troops to spare for such labour. The inability to predict and prepare for Ukrainian counterattacks is a massive intelligence failure. Russia in many instances chose to withdraw its soldiers without their equipment, showing that while it is prioritising saving Russian soldiers’ lives, its ability to plan and prepare is inadequate. Furthermore, the withdrawals have exposed Russian speakers in Ukraine to retribution at the hands of neo-Nazi elements that form part of the Ukrainian forces. This almost certainly will weaken the morale of Russian speakers in other parts of Ukraine and reduce their incentive to collaborate with Russia. Russia’s reversals are large and significant, though they are not yet decisive.
International position
The world respects strength and treats the weak with contempt. Russia’s setbacks demonstrate that, in conventional terms, Russia is no match for the United States, and that its power is inflated. With Russia on the backfoot, China will extract every economic concession possible to make sure it gains maximum advantage, in Central Asia, in the acquisition of Russian resources and in access to Russian technology, including jet engines, guidance systems and the like. Whether or not China will be a reliable partner for Russia is the key question. China appears so far unwilling to give Russia access to its manufacturing capacity – that is, to use Russian blueprints to produce Russian weapons in its factories – though, if it did, that would be a game changer. China’s preference over the last few decades has been to focus solely on its own core interests, which it has so far defined primarily in economic terms. The US pressure on China in terms of economic sanctions and in relation to Taiwan may well force China’s hand, however, pushing it to support Russia more fully even at the risk of imperilling its economy. From China’s perspective, the US is treating Taiwan as a sovereign country as well as a military base from which to threaten China, and the situation is becoming increasingly unacceptable.
Iran has emerged as a strong beneficiary of this conflict. Its drone technology has been tried and tested in a new arena. This gives more credence to other technologies Iran has claimed success in, such as anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles. That said, it is unclear to me if Iran can provide enough drones over the long run, however, and what price it would extract. It is worth recalling that Iran, through the Houthi and Hezbollah, has managed to thwart and humiliate Saudi Arabia and Israel, and is the only power that has consistently taken on US allies and clients and won, though never the US itself. Iran’s tactics have evolved from merely providing large amounts of missiles to Hezbollah. Now, Iran provides intelligence support, targeting information, UAVs that can evade air-defences, anti-ship missiles, maritime drones, ballistic missiles with advanced guidance, tactical training and other capabilities that it has used successfully even in the face of overwhelming US-supplied air superiority. Russia will be eager to learn from Iran. Their relationship will solidify.
Turkey is a fair weather friend to both the West and to Russia. While it does not want its Turkic and Islamic identity to be compromised by the US’ efforts to make Anatolia – and, indeed, the rest of the world – into California, it is not above kicking a frenemy when he’s down, especially a historic rival like Russia. Turkey will try to gain maximum advantage in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Syria, Libya and other theatres, even in partnership with the US and Israel, and even as it fights US influence at home.
India, Egypt, Brazil and others will continue to pursue trade with Russia while eschewing the dollar and euro, to sanction proof their economies and assert their sovereignty. For their part, OPEC countries will likely work with Russia to ensure that no oil price cap is enforceable. If such a cap succeeds against Russia today over the invasion of Ukraine, it could succeed against them tomorrow over issues such as human rights or the environment. As for Europe, it will continue to suffer the degradation of its agricultural and industrial capacity due to its decision to cut itself off from Russian gas. The main beneficiaries of this conflict so far are Iran, China, Turkey and the United States. The main loser is Europe. Russia’s position will depend on how well it fares at the end of this conflict.
Future steps:
Now, Russia faces the prospect of having to turn much of its economy to military production, and to engage in partial and perhaps in the future full mobilisation. Russia is presenting the war as another great defence of the homeland, similar to the Great Patriotic War (World War II). Putin’s full statement and previous actions indicate that Russia now correctly views this conflict as existential and protracted. The sanctions have shown that the West intends to annihilate Russia economically. The military aid rendered to Ukraine has shown that the West’s objective is to reduce Russia from major power to a defeated nation, with no choice but to follow the diktats of a decadent, arrogant America. If it is to have a chance to win without resorting to nuclear weapons, Russia will need to turn the conflict into a long, bloody fight, where it takes advantage of its strategic depth, abundant natural resources and industrial capacity to produce cheap, reliable, low-tech weapons in volumes that overwhelm its opponents over time. This makes it easy to imagine that this war would be another Iran - Iraq war, with the two sides receiving support from external partners and engaged in a gruesome indecisive conflict.
Russian offensive operations are now focused on capturing the remaining parts of Donetsk, with a view of declaring the special military operation a success, having already captured Lugansk. From there, Russia’s priority would reasonably be to defend its gains, rather than to continue with further offensives aimed at cutting off Odessa, encircling Kharkov or targeting Dnepropetrovsk, as I had initially expected. Such plans will be on hold until the Russians’ military performance improves, if they are not cancelled indefinitely.
Russia’s allies and clients in Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporozhye are accelerating plans to hold referendums on joining the Russian Federation. Kherson and Zaporozhye are critical to holding Crimea, and so Russia needs to control them to prevent a more embarrassing defeat than the one it has suffered already in Kharkov. The referendums are scheduled for 23-27 September, and their results are a forgone conclusion. Once these territories are legally part of Russia under Russian law, it would be permissible for Russia to send conscripts there, most likely with a view to reinforcing defences there. This would be in addition to the 300,000 soldiers that Russia intends to mobilise as per President Putin’s announcement on 21 September. In his speech announcing this mobilisation, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff”. I read this statement as a threat to use tactical nuclear weapons to defend the territories that Russia intends to annex. Russia’s policy on the first use of nuclear weapons is vague and evolving. It is reasonable to assume, however, that Russia would use nuclear weapons to end a war that it views as being against NATO, where it has begun to lose and where the gains it has made are at threat. However, I would caution against jumping to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons is imminent. If it was, partial mobilisation, which is best understood as aimed at consolidating Russia’s position in territories that are set to be annexed by end September and at regaining the initiative, would make much less sense.
With Ukraine having gained the momentum, and with the West committed to defeating Russia, Russia now is under pressure to pursue a scorched earth policy in Ukraine, and to attack as much civilian and dual use infrastructure as it can. However, Russia’s losses are likely to encourage the West to give Ukraine the offensive weapons it would need to retaliate in kind. Ukraine is fully committed. It has endless Western backing. Though it is fully mobilised already, it also has a stream of volunteers going its way. This combination makes Putin’s nuclear threat even more dangerous. Will Putin calculate that he can regain the initiative with the latest decrees, or will he calculate that the risk of defeat is so large and so imminent that a nuclear strike is necessary sooner rather than later?