In Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington defines ‘core states’ as the states that are seen as sufficiently credible and powerful by other states in their civilization to set the rules, offer protection, and establish order within their civilizational sphere of influence. For example, Russia historically played this role for Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Serbia. The United States emerged as the core state of Western civilization, setting the trading rules and providing for defense, as well as setting the cultural tone. China is the core state of East Asia, with strong historic cultural influences over Korea and Japan, and a significant and economically prosperous Chinese diaspora in Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries in the region, and with aspirations to match that cultural role with defence capability and commercial ties. Huntington also pointed out that Islam has lacked a core state since the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. He attributes the instability of the Muslim world partially to this leaderlessness. This piece posits that the struggle between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran is a multilayered contest over which state becomes the ‘core state’ of the Muslim world. The three are competing over which Islam to export to the world, over spheres of influence in the Middle East and beyond, and over representing Muslims abroad and protecting their interests. In that sense, Iran’s export of revolutionary ideology is similar to the Saudis’ export of Wahhabism and Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood. All three states aim to convince Muslims of their values and political system, and that theirs should be the voice speaking for the Muslim world.
The war for the heart of the Muslim world
The war for the heart of the Muslim world
The war for the heart of the Muslim world
In Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington defines ‘core states’ as the states that are seen as sufficiently credible and powerful by other states in their civilization to set the rules, offer protection, and establish order within their civilizational sphere of influence. For example, Russia historically played this role for Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Serbia. The United States emerged as the core state of Western civilization, setting the trading rules and providing for defense, as well as setting the cultural tone. China is the core state of East Asia, with strong historic cultural influences over Korea and Japan, and a significant and economically prosperous Chinese diaspora in Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries in the region, and with aspirations to match that cultural role with defence capability and commercial ties. Huntington also pointed out that Islam has lacked a core state since the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. He attributes the instability of the Muslim world partially to this leaderlessness. This piece posits that the struggle between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran is a multilayered contest over which state becomes the ‘core state’ of the Muslim world. The three are competing over which Islam to export to the world, over spheres of influence in the Middle East and beyond, and over representing Muslims abroad and protecting their interests. In that sense, Iran’s export of revolutionary ideology is similar to the Saudis’ export of Wahhabism and Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood. All three states aim to convince Muslims of their values and political system, and that theirs should be the voice speaking for the Muslim world.